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DORMANT MINERAL INTERESTS AND THE
CONTRACT CLAUSE: VAN SLOOTEN v.
LARSEN
Dormant mineral interests' severely diminish the effective use of
our natural resources.2 The inability to exploit these needed energy
1. Dormant mineral interests are gas and oil interests that sellers of land severed
from the surface rights by a clause in the conveyance reserving the rights to the gran-
tor. Rathbun v. Michigan, 284 Mich. 521, 280 N.W. 35 (1938). The reservation in the
contract creates "two separate and distinct estates in land." Asher v. Gibson, 198 Ky.
285, 248 S.W. 862 (1923). One estate consists of the mineral rights and one of the
surface rights. Each is subject to the laws of descent, and each can be conveyed sepa-
rately from the other. Kincaid v. McGowan, 88 Ky. 91, 4 S.W. 802 (1887). At times
the mineral rights become so dominant that a court will permit the mineral owner to
destroy the surface estate in order to extract minerals. Peabody Coal Co. v. P.C.
Pasco, 452 F.2d 1126 (6th Cir. 1971).
Common law courts called these interests corporeal hereditaments, which the own-
ers could not abandon. Van Slooten v. Larsen, 410 Mich. 21, 299 N.W.2d 704 (1980).
See generally Robertson, .4bandonment of Mineral Rights, 21 STAN. L. REV. 1227
(1969).
2. Several persons combine to buy a gas and oil interest, because the cost is usu-
ally very high. Brief of Appellant at iv, Bickel v. Fairchild, 83 Mich. App. 467, 268
N.W.2d 881 (1978) (companion case to Van Slooten v. Larsen, 86 Mich. App. 437,272
N.W.2d 675 (1978); see note 13 infra). Through the years, by conveyance or succes-
sion, the ownership becomes held by even more people, each having a small percent-
age, but many of whom are not even acquainted with the other owners. Brief of
Appellant at iv. If one owner were to decide he wanted to develop the oil or gas
resources in the land, he would be required to locate all other fractionalized interest
holders. Id This chore may prove insurmountable, even after only one generation
from the initial sale, since by this time a plethora of owners already exists. Id Fur-
ther, because these owners are not required to pay property taxes in many states (in-
cluding Michigan), and/or they do not live within the local area, tracing them
becomes even more difficult. Id at v.
The mineral interest owner willing to search for natural resources (assuming the
absence of a statute resembling the Michigan Dormant Minerals Act; see note 10
infra) has only one risky alternative. He can drill without the consent of the other
owners with the risk that he will not receive equitable compensation for the drilling
costs when the other owners come to collect their profit percentages. Smith, Methods
for Facilitating the Development of Oil and Gas Lands Burdened with Outstanding Min-
eral Interests, 43 TEx. L. REV. 129, 133 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Methods]. The
non-consenting owner is entitled to profits after deducting the drilling costs, but fre-
quently courts do not reimburse entirely, leaving the drilling owner with a loss. Id at
131-32. The risk becomes especially severe because courts often fail to provide coin-
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sources has restrained title marketability3 and threatens to further in-
crease energy costs throughout the country.4 The higher costs of en-
ergy needed for transportation and residential temperature control
have drastic effects on urban housing patterns.5 Increased transporta-
tion costs cause many urban workers to relocate closer to their places
of employment,6 and increased costs of maintaining a single-family
home may result in a higher urban density of multifamily units.7
pensation for the drilling of dry wells. Id at 132. Considering the tremendous capital
outlay involved, this is not a very feasible alternative, especially if drilling proves
fruitless. Brief of Appellant at v. In most areas then, including Michigan, the owners
refrain from drilling until they have received full consent. Id at vi.
The problem facing a willing owner of oil or gas interests is even more severe be-
cause he can only discover the minerals with accuracy by exploration. The owner can
use geological investigation, but the reliability of the available tests is dubious. A
sensible owner will not pay for expensive testing which could itself prove unreliable,
particularly when the expenditure is without assured contribution from other owners.
Excavation of other mineral interests is more feasible because discovery of these re-
sources is geologically possible by mere observation of surface condition. Zd
Oil companies can profit only by testing large areas. An owner of a mineral inter-
est, therefore, may lose the opportunity to have his land tested, perhaps explored, if
adjacent lands are unavailable due to unascertained interest holders. Further, if an
owner is in an area being explored, he may deprive his neighbor of any benefits,
because the driller's oil or gas well may deplete the reservoir underlying both pieces
of property. Brief of Appellant at vii.
Additionally, in a handful of jurisdictions, namely Louisiana, West Virginia and
Illinois, another problem inhibits exploration. In these jurisdictions, the taking of
mineral resources from the land constitutes waste which can be enjoined by any co-
tenant. This creates a situation where, the smaller the interest, the more willing the
owner is to hold out for a bonus in exchange for his approval. Methods, supra, at 131.
3. Incidental to the inability to obtain the gas and oil resources, of course, is the
tremendous restraint on alienation. Titles to these subsurface interests are virtually
not marketable, because of the great difficulty purchasers would have in developing
the resources. Thus, absent legislative action, the mineral rights are destined to re-
main in the same owners, with little possibility of development. See generally Brief of
Appellant at iv-xi.
4. G. BROWN, MEASUREMENT OF THE IMPACT OF THE ENERGY SITUATIONS ON
URBAN TRENDS, A4ppendix to URBAN TRENDS AND THE ENERGY SITUATION: PRO-
CEEDINGS OF THE COMMITTEE ON INVESTMENT CONSEQUENCES OF URBAN GROWTH
TRENDS 33 [hereinafter cited as URBAN GROWTH TRENDS].
5. Id at 33.
6. Id The higher the cost of energy for transportation (commuting expense), the
closer will urban workers tend to live to their places of employment. This will cause
greater density in the urban work areas. Id
7. Id As the cost of energy increases, the cost of building or living in a single-
family dwelling will increase relative to that of a multi-family unit. This creates a
disincentive in the construction or purchase of single-family dwellings; urban areas
thus become more densely populated with multifamily units.
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DORMANT MINERAL INTERESTS
Confronted with this important public issue, several states have en-
acted statutes8 to alleviate the dormant mineral interests problem.
The statutes, however, have not escaped constitutional challenge
under the contract clause.9 Michigan passed the Dormant Minerals
Act"° which deems oil or gas interests abandoned if the owner does
not take possession, transfer, or record the interest for a period of
twenty years. t" In Van Slooten v. Larsen, 2 the Supreme Court of
Michigan held that the Michigan statute did not violate the contract
8. See note 60 infra.
9. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10: "No state shall.. . pass any bill of Attainder, ex post
facto law, or law impairing the obligation of Contracts." See, e.g. notes 64-73 and
accompanying text infra.
10. MICH. CoMp. LAWS § 554.291 (MIcH. STAT. ANN. § 26.1163(1) (Callaghan
1970)), stating that:
Sec. 1. Any interest in oil or gas in any land owned by any person other than
the owner of the surface, which has not been sold, leased, mortgaged or trans-
ferred by instrument recorded in the register of deeds office for the county where
such interest is located for a period of 20 years shall, in the absence of the issu-
ance of a drilling permit as to such interest or the actual production or with-
drawal of oil or gas from said lands ...during such period for 20 years, be
deemed abandoned, unless the owner thereof shall, within 3 years after the effec-
tive date of this act or within 20 years after the last sale, lease, mortgage or trans-
fer of record of such interest or within 20 years after the last issuance of a drilling
permit as to such interests or actual production or withdrawal of oil or gas, from
said lands,. . . record a claim as hereinafter provided. Any interest in oil or gas
deemed abandoned as herein provided shall vest as of the date of such abandon-
ment in the owner or owners of the surface in keeping with the character of the
surface ownership.
Id
Harold Street proposed the statute in an article written in 1963. Street, Needfor
Legislation to Eliminate Dormant Realty Interests, 42 MICH. ST. B.J. 49 (1963) [herein-
after cited as Needfor Legislation].
A similar statute passed by the Michigan legislature is the Michigan Marketable
Title Act. MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 565.101 (MICH. STAT. ANN. § 26.1271 (Calla-
ghan 1970)). This statute, however, does not solve the problem of dormant mineral
interests. Methods, supra note 2, at 152. The state specifically had to address this
problem in a new statute. Needfor Legislation, supra, at 50.
11. The statute is generally a good vehicle for alleviating the dormant mineral
interests problem. Those interested in developing the resources are afforded the op-
portunity to locate the owners. If an interest holder records, he can be contacted. If
he fails to record, the surface holder, who can easily be located by title search, takes
the interest. After all holders are located, oil companies, for example, can purchase
the rights, or interested owners can obtain consent to explore.
The statute achieves its goal more effectively if the interest holders do not record.
Since there are probably fewer surface owners than mineral interest holders, when the
holders fail to record, fewer individuals must be placated before exploration. How-
ever, even if the holders do record, the statute is of tremendous value to the state,
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clause of the United States Constitution."3
In 1943, a property owner conveyed her land while contractually
reserving her interests in the subsurface gas and oil rights.14 The
grantor, however, never recorded her reserved interests. 5 Defend-
ants, heirs to the original grantor and others, did not record their
interests in the mineral rights until 1970.16 Plaintiff, successor to the
grantee's interest in the 1943 sale, claimed title to the subsurface
rights by operation of the Dormant Minerals Act. 7 Defendant as-
serted that the statute violated the contract clause. 8 The Supreme
Court of Michigan, in finding that the statute had only insubstan-
tially impaired "the obligation of contract" rejected this argument.' 9
because these owners then become easily locatable, resulting in the facilitation of re-
source development. See Needfor Legislation, supra note 10.
The statute is not perfectly reasonable because it does not distinguish between those
owners who could be located and those who are non-ascertainable. See notes 103-04
and accompanying text infra. Perhaps the state legislature drafted the statute broadly
because its purpose can better be achieved with the extinguishment of all interests
rather than only unknown interests. As mentioned, if the interests are extinguished
fewer owners remain because more surface holders receive interests and the other
mineral interest owners lose their rights. With a decrease in the number of owners,
the opportunity for exploration increases. Nonetheless, the legislature made a judg-
ment to draw the statute broadly (perhaps even to reduce the cost of giving notice to
accessible owners), a judgment which the courts will generally view with deference.
See notes 108-09 and accompanying text infra.
12. 410 Mich. 21, 299 N.W.2d 704 (1980).
13. Id The contract clause was implicated in Van Slooten because the statute
impairs obligations created in the land conveyance agreement upon the owner's fail-
ure to comply. Id at 39, 299 N.W.2d at 708. Courts have generally recognized that
property rights are protected by the contract clause. Mahood v. Bessemer Properties,
Inc., 154 Fla. 710, 18 So.2d 775 (1944) (a Florida statute extinguished property inter-
ests if the owner failed to record).
The Supreme Court of Michigan at the same time decided the companion case to
Van Slooten, Bickel v. Fairchild, 410 Mich. 21, 299 N.W.2d 704 (1980), which
presented identical issues of law. Van Slooten and Bickel are the first cases to specifi-
cally address the constitutionality of the Michigan Dormant Minerals Act. Other
state courts, however, have evaluated similar statutes. See notes 64-73 and accompa-
nying text infra.
14. Van Slooten v. Larsen, 86 Mich. App. 437, 441, 272 N.W.2d 675, 676 (1978).
15. Id
16. Id
17. Id
18. 410 Mich. at 39, 299 N.W.2d at 708. The trial court found for the defendant,
holding the statute unconstitutional. The court of appeals reversed. Van Slooten v.
Larsen, 86 Mich. App. 437, 272 N.W.2d 675 (1978).
19. 410 Mich. at 40-41, 299 N.W.2d at 708-09. The majority addressed other con-
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A vigorous dissent, applying a balancing test under the federal con-
tract clause, would have held the statute unconstitutional.20
The framers of the Constitution designed the contract clause to
restrain arbitrary state2 interference with private and public agree-
ments." The clause does not absolutely prohibit23 legislatures from
passing laws that impair the obligation of contracts;24 it restricts the
state only when the public need does not justify the private interfer-
stitutional issues, including both substantive and procedural due process. id at 41-45,
299 N.W.2d at 708-10.
The court disposed of three substantive due process arguments: 1) the act did not
unconstitutionally convert a property right into a cause of action because the interest
holder only had to record and was not required to initiate a suit, 2) the forced aban-
donment of corporeal hereditaments did not deny substantive due process, since the
statute served a public purpose and provided a reasonable relationship between the
means chosen and public purpose sought to be promoted, 3) the statute did not create
an unconstitutional presumption. Id at 43-52, 299 N.W.2d at 709-16.
The court also rejected the defendants' procedural due process argument. After
balancing the competing interests involved, the court ruled that the state was not re-
quired to provide a pre-deprivation hearing. The convention of procedural regular-
ity, therefore, does not require the statute to give notice of a hearing. Id at 52-55, 299
N.W.2d at 715-16. Also, the court earlier stated that the statute itself constitutes suffi-
cient notice of the recording requirement. Id at 52 n.28, 299 N.W.2d at 714 n.28.
20. Id at 56-65, 299 N.W.2d at 716-20.
21. The prohibition against the impairment of the obligation of contracts does not
apply to the federal government. Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen of
N. America v. Connally, 337 F. Supp. 737, 763 (D.D.C. 1971) (not applicable to Presi-
dent's stabilization of prices, wages and rents under the Economic Stabilization Act of
1970).
22. Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 212, 216, 354, 355 (1827). The initial
tone of the Framers' debate over the clause indicates a specific fear that the legisla-
tures would provide instant relief for debtors from contractual obligations. Holiday
Magic, Inc. v. Warren, 357 F. Supp. 20 (E.D. Wis. 1973), vacated on other grounds,
497 F.2d 687 (7th Cir. 1974). Despite this specific intent, courts generally have inter-
preted the clause to insure "protection from unjust acts of legislation in any form." 25
U.S. (12 Wheat.) at 216.
23. In the 19th century, the prohibition provided a significant restraint. Prior to
1889, the Supreme Court considered the contract clause in approximately forty per-
cent of all questions concerning the constitutionality of state legislative action. In fact,
the contract clause argument was so persuasive that at that time almost half of all
Supreme Court decisions declaring state legislation invalid were justified by adher-
ence to the contract clause. B. WRIGHT, JR., THE CoNTRAcT CLAUSE OF THE CON-
STITUTION 5 (1938).
24. The judicial decisions have consistently adhered to the position that the con-
tract clause is not an absolute prohibition. See, e.g., Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v.
Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 428 (1934). (A Minnesota statute that impairs land purchase
agreements held constitutional).
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ence.25 The United States Supreme Court, in defining the scope of
the doctrine, confronts a most difficult analysis. By its nature, the
inquiry cannot be reduced to a precise mathematical formulation, but
involves a delicate balance of state and individual interests.26
The landmark decision in contract clause analysis is Home Building
& Loan Association v. Blaisdell.27 In Blaisdell, plaintiff challenged
the constitutionality of a Minnesota statute28 which, during the de-
pression,' retroactively extended the statutory redemption3" period
following foreclosure purchase agreements.31 The Supreme Court
ruled that because the statutory purpose was legitimate and the
means adopted were reasonab!e and appropriate, 32 the Minnesota act
25. El Paso v. Simmons, 379 U.S. 497, 508-09 (1965); W.B. Worthen v. Thomas,
292 U.S. 426, 433 (1934) (for a thorough discussion of Simmons and Thomas, see note
39 infra); Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 428 (1934) (for a
thorough discussion of Blaisdell, see notes 27-38 and accompanying text infra).
26. Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 390, 428 (1934).
27. 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
28. The Minnesota Mortgage Moratorium Law, 1933 MINN. LAWS 339.
The statute allowed local courts discretion to extend the statutory redemption pe-
riod (see note 30 infra) after foreclosure sale for such time as the court deemed fair.
The extension could last only as long as the emergency caused by the depression with
the further restriction that it not extend beyond May 1, 1935. In addition to the exten-
sion, the statute required the mortgagor to pay fair rental value of the property and
apply this sum to taxes, insurance, interest and principal. 290 U.S. at 415-18.
29. Id at 416. The statute described that, because of the severe economic situation
resulting in low prices, high unemployment, and extremely difficult credit, owners of
real property would be unable to make the necessary mortgage payments. The statute
was designed to alleviate the severity of the emergency by providing additional op-
portunity for the owners to recover property lost through foreclosure. 1933 MINN.
LAWS 339.
30. Redemption is defined as "The realization of a right to have the title of a
property restored free and clear. .. . The act of a vendor of property in buying it
back again from the purchaser...." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1149 (5th ed.
1979).
31. 290 U.S. at 416. Defendant lost his property due to foreclosure and success-
fully petitioned the local court for an extension on his period of redemption. Plaintiff,
who purchased the land at the foreclosure sale; claimed that the extension provided
by the new statute impaired the obligation of his purchase agreement. Plaintiff ex-
pected to get clear title to the land two weeks after the statute was passed. The statute
postponed the plaintiffs receipt of clear title, or even could have prevented plaintiff's
acquisition of the land altogether if the defendant redeemed during the extension
period. Plaintiff asserted that the contract clause prohibited the statute. Id at 416-26.
32. Id. at 442. The Court believed, by this test, it was establishing a "rational
compromise" between public need and individual rights. Id
(Vol. 23:263
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did not violate the contract clause.33
The Blaisdell Court held that an implied reservation of the state's
protective powers inheres in all contracts. 34 Thus, when the state ex-
ercises these powers by adopting legislation, the new law does not
conflict with the contractual arrangement; rather, the contract implic-
itly incorporates the new statutory terms. 35 The Court established a
reasonableness standard to determine when the Constitution permits
the state to exercise these reserved powers, allowing public expedi-
ence to override private interests. 36 The Court considered several
factors pertinent to its constitutional analysis. In particular, the
Court considered: 1) whether a public emergency existed; 2) whether
the statute addressed the protection of a societal rather than a private
interest; 3) whether the relief closely fits the emergency while being
available only upon reasonable conditions; 4) whether the statute is
generally not unreasonable; and 5) whether the legislation operates
only temporarily.37 By balancing these criteria, the Court found that
33. Id at 447. The Court pointed out that the emergency did not expand the scope
of the legislative authority, but rather justified the employment of a power inherent in
state sovereignty. Id at 425-26.
34. Id at 435-36.
35. Id Perhaps the Court's reliance on the existence of an implied condition in
every contract of the state's reserved protective power is unfounded in logic. In order
to treat all parties fairly, the law will imply conditions into contracts. The parties,
however, by contract, can expressly negate those conditions that otherwise the law
will imply. Logically then, if the parties in Blaisdell had expressly agreed that there
would be no contractual modification during an emergency, the contract could not
impliedly incorporate the statutory terms. The statute would, in fact, directly conflict
with the express contractual arrangement and thus would impair the obligation of
contract. Certainly, if such an expression had been made in the contract, the Blaisdell
Court still would not have invalidated the statute. One might conclude that the Court
intended a validation of the police power apart from any principle of contract law, as
long as the end was legitimate and the means reasonable and appropriate. I U. CHI.
L. REV. 639 (1934).
The Court does not rely entirely on the contract analysis that denies any impair-
ment. Either of these approaches, the implied contract theory or the theory based on
"the general good of the people," ultimately requires a court to make the same analy-
sis--whether the legislation is reasonable and appropriate, and serves a legitimate
state interest. 290 U.S. at 438. Chief Justice Hughes, throughout the opinion, recites
what he believes to be the majority view that statutes can impair the obligation of
contracts in order to achieve "the general good of the people." Id at 437. For a
thorough discussion of Blaisdell, see Note, Constitutionality of Mortgage Relief Legis-
lation: Home Building and Loan v. Blaisdell, 47 HARv. L. Rnv. 660, 661-62 (1934).
36. 290 U.S. at 438-39.
37. Id at 445-47, 451. The Blaisdell Court considered the above five criteria. The
Court found that the Depression created an emergency which made mortgage pay-
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Washington University Open Scholarship
URBAN LAW ANNUAL
the Minnesota statute was a constitutional exercise of the state's sov-
ereign powers.38
The Supreme Court did not significantly modify the Blaisdell anal-
ysis until 197811 in Allied Structural Steel v. Spannaus.4° In Spannaus,
ments impossible. The emergency did not broaden the scope of the legislative author-
ity, but merely justified the employment of a power inherent in state sovereignty. Id
at 451. See note 29 supra. As to the second criteria, the Court noted that the legisla-
ture had adopted the statute for the protection of the people from a public disaster.
290 U.S. at 445. See note 29 supra. The third and fourth criteria seem to overlap to a
large extent. The Court noted several factors bearing on both of these questions. The
Court pointed out that the mortgage indebtedness was not destroyed, the interest con-
tinues, and the sale was still valid. Further, the purchaser could still acquire title or a
deficiency judgment if the mortgagor did not redeem, and the conditions placed on
redemption were maintained. In addition, the mortgagor was required to pay the fair
rental value of the land to be applied towards the payment of insurance, interest,
taxes and mortgage indebtedness. This provided compensation to the purchaser for
his inability to use the land during the extension period. The Court found that the
statute was a reasonable attempt to strike a balance between mortgagors' and pur-
chasers' rights. 290 U.S. at 445-46. Finally, the legislation clearly met the fifth crite-
rion. The Court asserted that the legislature authorized the statute to operate only
during the emergency for which it was created, and in no case more than two years.
Id at 447.
38. Id at 447.
39. During the decade ending in 1945 the Court evaluated contract clause ques-
tions with reference to the criteria established in Blaisdell. Cases decided immedi-
ately subsequent to Blaisdell indicated a substantial role for the contract clause. The
first such case, also decided in 1934, was W.B. Worthen Co. v. Thomas, 292 U.S. 426
(1934). The Court found that an Arkansas statute, which exempted the proceeds of
life insurance from attachment by creditors, was not reasonable because the legisla-
ture adopted means that were not narrowly drawn to the achievement of the legisla-
tive ends. The statute was not temporary, and failed to provide any condition for the
protection of the creditor. "The Act contains no limitations as to time, amount, cir-
cumstances or need." Id at 434-35. Justice Sutherland vigorously disagreed with the
majority methodology. In his constitutional analysis, Sutherland saw no difference
between the Arkansas statute and the Minnesota statute in Blaisdell. Again, he failed
to see how "emergency can ever justify, or, what is really the same thing, can ever
furnish an occasion for justifying, a nullification of the constitutional restriction upon
state power in respect of the impairment of contractual obligations." Id at 434-35
(Sutherland, J., concurring).
In W.B. Worthen v. Kavanaugh, 295 U.S. 56 (1935), an Arkansas statute sharply
diminished the remedies available to mortgagees. As in Blaisdel, the Court abrogated
the distinction made years earlier that legislation could impair remedies and not obli-
gatios. See Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 212 (1827) (A New York statute
destroyed a debt owed to plaintiff. The Court held that, since the statute did not
operate retroactively to extinguish interests created before the statute, it was constitu-
tional); Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122 (1819), (The Court invali-
dated a New York statute which destroyed debts created prior to the statute. The
Court, in dicta, asserted that the law would even be unconstitutional if it extinguished
interests arising after the passage of the statute. Ogden, however, later denied this
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constitutional extension). Justice Cardozo, writing the majority opinion in Kava-
naugh, held that the statute was drawn too broadly, permitting unnecessary interfer-
ence with private rights. 295 U.S. at 62-63.
The Court in Triegle v. Acme Homestead Ass'n, 297 U.S. 189 (1936), relied on
Blaisdell's first criterion (see note 37 supra) to invalidate a Louisiana statute which
changed the rights of withdrawing members of building and loan associations. The
Court held that because the statute only impaired rights of members in relation to
each other, the state did not address a public issue and consequently, the statute was
unconstitutional. Contra, Veix v. Sixth Ward Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 310 U.S. 32 (1940).
(The Court upheld a similar New Jersey statute as constitutional. The Court found
that the legislation promoted a public purpose.)
The Supreme Court did not continue its trend of invalidating state legislation. In-
stead, in East N.Y. Say. Bank v. Hahn, 326 U.S. 230 (1945), the Court upheld a New
York statute which extended for an additional year a prohibition on foreclosure of
mortgages. In finding the statute constitutional, the Court reformulated the Blaisdell
test.
The Blaisdell case and decisions rendered since.., yield this governing consti-
tutional principle: when a widely diffused public interest has become enmeshed
in a network of multitudinous private arrangements, the authority of the state 'to
safeguard the vital interests of the people,' 290 U.S. 398, 434, is not to be gar-
nished by abstracting one such arrangement from its public context and treating
it as though it were an isolated private contract constitutionally immune from
impairment.
Id at 232. See also Faitoute Iron & Steel v. City of Asbury Park, 316 U.S. 502 (1942)
(The Court held constitutional a New Jersey statute which authorized the state to
adjust debts of insolvent municipalities). For a general discussion of post-Blaisdell
contract clause decisions, see Vernon, The Contract Clause and the Court: A View of
Precedent and Practice in ConstitutionalAdjudication, 54 TUL. L. REv. 117 (1979).
By 1965, as evidenced in the Supreme Court decision of El Paso v. Simmons, 379
U.S. 497 (1965), the clause provided little, if any, restraint on state legislative action.
G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 561 (10th ed. 1980). Simmons involved a 1910
sale by Texas of public land to private individuals at a very low down payment (one-
fortieth of the price, 379 U.S. at 510) and an equally low interest rate. The Texas law
provided that, upon payment of interest, the contract would be terminated and the
land forfeited. As long as the land had not been sold again by the state, the purchaser
could re-assert his rights upon written request and payment of the delinquent interest.
Then, in 1941, the legislature amended the original statute, limiting the reinstatement
to five years from the forfeiture date. Plaintiff, Simmons, defaulted in 1947 and the
state denied his request for reinstatement made after the five-year period. The state
sold the land to El Paso, and Simmons brought suit, claiming that the 1941 amend-
ment unconstitutionally impaired the obligation of contract. The Court relied on
Blaisdell to find the statute constitutional. It established a balance between state and
private interests. The Texas legislature found that the unlimited period of reinstate-
ment had caused a plethora of clouded titles, preventing unobstructed marketability
and prohibiting an effective use of the land. This public interest outweighed the pri-
vate interest, especially because there was only a minor impairment and more impor-
tantly, this impairment was not focused at the essence of the bargain. The purchasers
had not bought the land because of their reliance on the prolonged reinstatement
period, and, therefore, relative to the great public need involved, this private interest
did not merit protection. Since the public interest warranted this level of private in-
19821
Washington University Open Scholarship
URBAN LAW ANNUAL
terference, the Court found the statute reasonable. Further, the Court showed an ex-
treme deference to the state legislature in determining reasonableness. The Simmons
Court cited East N. Z Say. Bank for the proposition that wide discretion must be
given to the state in deciding what legislative measures are necessary. 379 U.S. at
508-09.
In United States Trust v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1 (1977), the Court suddenly shifted
its position when for the first time in nearly 40 years it invalidated a statute as violat-
ing the prohibition against the impairment of contract. The action revitalized the
strength of the contract clause. In 1921, New York and New Jersey agreed to estab-
lish a joint port authority. 1921 N.Y. LAWS. ch. 154 (current version at N.Y. UNCON-
SOL. LAWS § 6401 (McKinney 1977)); 1921 N.J. LAWS ch. 151 (current version at N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 32:1-1-24 (West 1964)). Later in 1962 New Jersey made a promise in a
statutory covenant. The promise was designed to induce investors to buy bonds for
the purpose of purchasing the Hudson and Manhattan Railroad and the construction
of the World Trade Center. The statutory promise provided that the money pledged
as security on the bonds would not be used to subsidize the railroad. A 1974 statute
then repealed the 1962 promise. Thus, the Court was faced with a determination of
whether the state unconstitutionally impaired the obligation it created in the 1962
statutory covenant.
The United States Trust Court reiterated a common position in contract clause
analysis: "'the legislature cannot bargain away the police powers of the state.' Stone
v. Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814, 817 (1880)." 431 U.S. at 23. See also West River Bridge
Co. v. Dix, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 507 (1848) (The state cannot alienate the power of emi-
nent domain); New Jersey v. Wilson, I1 U.S. (7 Cranch.) 164 (1812) (The state can
alienate the taxing and spending powers.) If the state does attempt to contract away
an inalienable power, the contract is void and no contract clause analysis is required.
The Court found that the New Jersey statute involved a financial obligation. It then
held that a state could validly alienate its financial powers. 431 U.S. at 24.
The United States Trust Court then had to determine the issue of whether the stat-
ute violated the contract clause. The Court applied the Blaisdell test, requiring the
statute to be reasonable and necessary while serving a legitimate public need. The
test was modified somewhat, because the 1974 repeal impaired a state obligation. The
Court asserted that, unlike Faitoute Iron & Steel Co. v. City of Asbury Park, 316 U.S.
502 (1942), there should be no deference to the legislature to determine what is rea-
sonable simply because of the state's self-interest in impairing its own contracts. In
essence, a higher level of scrutiny is established for impairment of public obligations.
The state put forth the public purpose of encouraging public transportation as op-
posed to private automobiles. The city articulated that the statute was necessary be-
cause the new mass transit facilities could not raise enough revenue to function
efficiently nor could the city spend more money, as it already had reached the permit-
ted deficit level. The Court stated that other less intrusive means were available to
achieve this purpose; if nothing else, a less severe modification of the 1962 covenant
may have sufficed. 431 U.S. at 25-30. Further, in comparing the case to Simmons, the
Court found that the repeal was not reasonable. In Simmons, the effects of the unlim-
ited period to reinstate were unforeseen while in this case the state knew of the pre-
vailing need for mass transportation, and should have foreseen it in 1962. The state's
failure to account for the foreseeable contingency bars the statute from validity under
the Constitution, especially in light of the drastic nature of the alteration (the statute
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a Minnesota statute4' directed plaintiff, a corporation, to pay pension
benefits not required under the contractual agreement plaintiff had
made with its employees.42 The Court, referring to the Blaisdell test,
recited the essential criteria,43 but added a new element to the analy-
sis. If the impairment of contract is not substantial, the inquiry will
terminate immediately in favor of constitutionality. If, however, the
alteration in the obligation exceeds a certain threshold level of sever-
ity, the full Blaisdell analysis becomes necessary.' In defining the
level of severity needed to merit a full analysis, the Court referred to
the value the Framers placed on private contracts. 45 Such a vague
definition left courts with little or no guidance in determining what
level of severity merits more thorough evaluation. The Spannaus
Court found the impairment there in issue severe enough to require a
Blaisdell analysis.46 It then concluded that the Minnesota statute was
repealed a promise that induced the investors into purchasing the bonds). Id at 30-
32.
40. 438 U.S. 234 (1978).
41, Minnesota's Private Pension Benefits Protection Act, MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 181B.01-.17 (West 1974).
42. 438 U.S. 236-39. In Spannaus, plaintiff set up a pension plan making employ-
ees eligible at age 65, without regard to length of service. The plan also allowed
certain other employees to collect payments at specified times. The Minnesota statute
provided that all companies which had pension plans and 100 or more employees
could be subjected to penalty payments. The statute imposed a penalty if, upon ter-
mination of the plan or company transfer from Minnesota, the pension assets were
not sufficient to cover full pensions for all employees with ten years of service or
more. Plaintiff closed its office and was directed to pay penalties for employees who
had no vested rights under the company's plan. Plaintiff brought suit claiming a vio-
lation of the contract clause. Id at 236-40.
43. Id at 241.
44. Id at 244-45. For the Blaisdell criteria see note 37 and accompanying text
supra. In establishing this rule, the Court stated that "the severity of the impairment
measures the hurdle the state legislation must clear." Id at 244-45. Courts often cite
this statement when deciding contract clause issues. Eg., Van Slooten v. Larsen, 410
Mich. 21, 39, 299 N.W.2d 704, 708 (1980).
45. 438 U.S. at 245. For a discussion of the Framers' intent, see note 22 supra.
46. Id at 246. The statute directed the company to re-calculate its pension on a
ten-year requirement, when payment into the pension plan had been made on a com-
pletely different basis. The company based its pension plan on assessment of future
liability, calculated according to foreseeable risk. The statute created a major unfore-
seen expense which destroyed the employer's reliance on prior evaluations and even
threatened the company's solvency. This statute, therefore, which imposed a $185,000
pension penalty charge, created a severe impairment of the company's contractual
obligation. Id at 245-46.
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unconstitutional because it failed to address a broad state interest 47
and was generally unreasonable.48
As illustrated by Spannaus, courts engaging in contract clause
analysis may reject a state's articulated economic purpose. Unlike
the economic interest presented in the Minnesota pension statute,49
courts generally recognize the legitimacy of a state's economic inter-
est in free title marketability and productive use of land resources."
For example, federal and state courts have upheld as constitutional
both recording acts51 and marketable title acts,52 even though they
47. Id at 249. The Court, in comparing this case to Blaisdell, found no public
emergency, such as the Depression. No great public interest necessitated the legisla-
tion. Id at 247-49.
48. Id at 247-50.
49. The Court could not sustain the constitutional presumption in favor of defer-
ring to the legislative findings of reasonableness. Since the statute was only applica-
ble to those who were thoughtful enough to voluntarily set up private pension plans, it
was unreasonable in its scope. The statute reached an area that the legislature had
never before addressed. Its unexpected and severe nature made the legislation unrea-
sonable. 1d at 247-50.
50. See e.g., El Paso v. Simmons, 397 U.S. 479 (1965), discussed in note 39 supra.
51. See American Land Co. v. Zeiss, 219 U.S. 47 (1911) (the San Francisco earth-
quake of 1906 destroyed many property records. The statute required owners to insti-
tute suits to clear title. It did not constitute a deprivation of property without due
process, as long as the statute provided a reasonable opportunity to be heard); Vance
v. Vance, 108 U.S. 514 (1883) (a Louisiana statute that required the recording of prop-
erty "mortgages and privileges" did not violate the contract clause. The Court only
demanded that such statutes provide ample time for the owner to comply.); Jackson v.
Lamphire, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 280 (1830) (New York granted land and then later required
the grantees to record their interests. The Court held that the additional recording
requirement did not conflict with the contract between the state and the grantee. The
contract did not prohibit the state from taking other legislative action in relation to
the land, and thus the statute did not impair the obligation of contract.); Mahood v.
Bessemer Properties, Inc., 154 Fla. 710, 18 So.2d 775 (1944) (A Florida statute re-
quired purchasers of land either to take possession or record. The Supreme Court of
Florida held that it was constitutional as long as the statute provided a reasonable
time to record.); Connecticut Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Talbot, 113 Ind. 373, 14 N.E. 586
(1887) (A statute provided that a subsequent good faith purchaser was entitled to take
if the prior owner failed to record his interest.); First Nat'l Bank v. Clark, 55 Kan.
219, 40 P. 270 (1895) (a statute extinguished a judgment creditor's lien if the creditor
failed to record the lien. The legislation provided a reasonable time to record.);
Knights of Maccabee v. Nitsch, 69 Neb. 372, 95 N.W. 626 (1903) (a statute required
all fraternal organizations to record with the Auditor of Public Accountants all
changes in the by-laws or constitutions of such organizations).
Courts generally will only hold a recording act constitutional if it provides a rea-
sonable time for the owner to comply. Courts, however, usually defer to the legisla-
ture's determination of reasonableness. See e.g., Terry v. Anderson, 95 U.S. 628
(1877) (a statute shortens a statute of limitations). See also Wichelman v. Messner,
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operate retroactively to extinguish property interests.
The Supreme Court of Nebraska found that the state's marketable
title act 3 did not violate the contract clause of the United States Con-
stitution. In Hiddleston v. Nebraska Jewish Education Society,54 the
court upheld a statute that automatically extinguished both rights of
reentry on breach of condition subsequent and possibilities of re-
verter thirty years after their creation.5 The court applied a reasona-
bleness standard analogous to that established in Blaisdell, but
applicable both to contract and due process clause analyses.56 It rea-
soned that the contractual impairment was not severe because the
interests with which the statute interfered represented only remote
possibilities of benefit. 7 The Hiddleston court held the statute consti-
tutional because the state's strong interest in land marketability justi-
fied the relatively slight private interference. 8 The marketable title
acts, as presented in Hiddleston, are distinguishable from statutes that
destroy mineral interests59 enacted in several states; 60 the latter de-
250 Minn. 88, 83 N.W.2d 800 (1957) (reasonable time requirement for a marketable
title act).
52. Marketable title acts are statutes that extinguish powers of termination or pos-
sibilities of reverter if the interest holder does not record within a particular period of
time. Some statutes, as presented in Hiddleston v. Nebraska Jewish Educ. Soe'y, 186
Neb. 786, 186 N.W.2d 904 (1971) destroy the interest whether or not the interest
holder records. See Wichelman v. Messner, 250 Minn. 88, 83 N.W.2d 800 (1957) (a
statute held constitutional which extinguishes interests if the owner had not recorded
for 40 years); contra, Board of Educ. of Cent. School Dist. No. 1 v. Miles, 15 N.Y.2d
364, 207 N.E.2d 181, 259 N.Y.S.2d 142 (1965) (a New York statute extinguished rights
of reentry and possibilities of reverter if the interest was created before September 1,
1931, and the interest holder failed to record before September 1, 1961. The Court of
Appeals of New York held the statute unconstitutional because it violated the con-
tract clause).
53. NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-2, 102 (Reissue 1971).
54. 186 Neb. 786, 186 N.W.2d 904 (1971).
55. NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-2, 102 (Reissue 1971).
56. 186 Neb. 790-91, 186 N.W.2d at 906. The court applies a reasonableness stan-
dard applicable to all retroactive legislation whether the constitutional challenge is
under the contract or due process clause. It finds several criteria relevant to this anal-
ysis: nature and strength of the public interest, the extent of modification of the as-
serted private right, and the nature of the right altered by the statute. Id See notes
71-72 and accompanying text infra.
57. 186 Neb. 790-91, 186 N.W.2d at 907.
58. Id at 790-91, 186 N.W.2d at 906-07.
59. Contos v. Herbst, 278 N.W.2d 732, 745-46 (Minn. 1979) (procedures in the
mineral registration statute held to violate due process).
60. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 704.05 (West Supp. 1982); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
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stroy fee simple estates61 while the former nullify only possibilities62
that such estates will later come into existence.63
Courts in several states have already ruled on the constitutionality
of dormant mineral interest statutes.64 In three such cases,65 state
supreme courts ignored contract clause implications, and held the
statutes unconstitutional entirely on procedural due process
grounds.66 The Supreme Court of Indiana, however, made a com-
plete contract clause analysis in Short v. Texaco, Inc. 67 and held that
the statute68 did not violate the Constitution. The court found that
the legislation addressed a legitimate state interest, and the means
30, § 197 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1981); IND. CODE §§ 32-5-11-1 to -8 (1976); LA. CIV.
CODE ANN. art. 490 (West 1980); MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 554.241-.294 (1970) (MICH.
STAT. ANN. 26.1163(1) (Callaghan 1970)); NEB. REV. STAT. § 57-228 to -231 (Reissue
1978); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 1-42.1-.4 (Supp. 1981); TENN. CODE ANN. § 64-704 (Supp.
1981); VA. CODE § 55-154 (1981).
61. See note 1 supra.
62. Contos v. Herbst, 278 N.W.2d 732, 745-46 (Minn. 1979).
63. Compare Contos, which found this difference important, with Wilson v. Isem-
inger, 185 U.S. 55 (1902) where the Court found this difference to be constitutionally
irrelevant. In Iseminger the Court held that a Pennsylvania statute that destroyed a
fee simple interest was constitutional. The statute concerned ground rent defined as
"rent reserved to him and his heirs by the grantor of the land, out of the land it-
self. ... It is a separate estate from the ownership of the ground, and is held to be
real estate, with the usual characteristics of an estate in fee simple, descendible, devis-
able, and alienable." Id at 59. The statute extinguished such interests when the own-
ers neither demanded ground rent for 21 years nor recorded in three years. The
destruction of the severed fee simple interests is most analogous to the operation of
the dormant mineral acts. Brief of Appellant at 6, Bickel v. Fairchild, 83 Mich. App.
467, 268 N.W.2d 881 (1978).
64. See, e.g., Wilson v. Bishop, 82 IM. 2d 364, 412 N.E.2d 522 (1980); Short v.
Texaco, Inc., 406 N.E.2d 625 (Ind. 1980); Van Slooten v. Larsen, 410 Mich. 21, 299
N.W.2d 704 (1980); Contos v. Herbst, 278 N.W.2d 732 (Minn. 1979); Wheelock v.
Heath, 201 Neb. 835, 272 N.W.2d 768 (1978); Chicago & N.W. Transp. Co. v. Peder-
sen, 80 Wis. 2d 566, 259 N.W.2d 316 (1977).
65. Wilson v. Bishop, 82 IM. 2d 364,412 N.E.2d 522 (1980); Contos v. Herbst, 278
N.W.2d 732 (Minn. 1979); Chicago & N.W. Transp. Co. v. Pedersen, 80 Wis. 2d 566,
259 N.W.2d 316 (1977) (also found to violate substantive due process).
66. The courts in Bishop, Contos and Pedersen found that the statutes failed to
provide adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard.
67. 406 N.E.2d 625 (Ind. 1980).
68. IND. CODE §§ 32-5-11-1 to 11-8 (1976). The Michigan and Indiana statutes
are virtually identical, the difference being that Indiana allows the owner only two
years after the date of enactment to record the oldest interests. Compare IND. CODE
§§ 32-8-11-1 to 11-8 (1976) with MICH. CoMP. LAWS § 554.291 (MICH. STAT. ANN.
§ 26.1163(l) (Callaghan 1970)). See note 10 supra.
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adopted rationally related to the achievement of the purpose.69 In
contrast, the Supreme Court of Nebraska in Wheelock v. Heath7"
reached the opposite conclusion. The court did not rely on the Blais-
dell test per se71 but instead, like Hiddleston, merged contract and
due process clause analyses, questioning only the reasonableness of
the legislation.72 Under this hybrid approach, it held the Nebraska
mineral statute73 unconstitutional.
The United States Supreme Court confronted this constitutional
controversy when it heard argument in Texaco, Inc. v. Short.74 The
Court took the case on appeal from the Indiana Supreme Court,
which earlier had held the Indiana Mineral Lapse Act constitu-
tional.75 After summarily disposing the contract clause claim,7 6 the
69. 406 N.E.2d at 630-31.
70. 201 Neb. 835, 272 N.W.2d 768 (1978). The court, by analogy, cited Hiddleston
for guidance in invalidating the Nebraska statute. id at 842-43, 272 N.W.2d at 773-
74.
71. The Blaisdell test really is made up of specific questions that all enter into a
reasonableness determination. The Blaisdell court made clear that reasonable and
appropriate legislation would be constitutional. See notes 37 and 56 and accompany-
ing text supra.
72. 201 Neb. 835 at 841-45, 272 N.W.2d at 772-74. Like the fliddleston court,
while the Wheelock court does not specifically address the Blaisdell criteria, it does
apply the same general test. Merging the due process and contract clause analysis by
questioning only the reasonableness of the statute is quite logical. One scholar even
suggested the Constitution would be the same without the contract clause. Courts
would reach identical results if they based constitutional decisions on whether the
statute provided for a reasonable deprivation. Hale, The Supreme Court and the Con-
tract Clause, 57 HARv. L. REv. 852, 890-91 (1944). Further support is given in Blais-
dell itself for the approach leading to identical results under both clauses in the
Constitution. The Blaisdell Court disposed of the due process argument by stating
that all previous contract clause discussion was applicable to due process as well. 290
U.S. at 448. For a general discussion of the constitutionality of retroactive legislation,
see Hochman, The Supreme Court and the Constitutionality of Retroactive Legislation,
73 HARv. L. REv. 692 (1960).
73. NEB. RaV. STAT. §§ 57-228 to 231 (Reissue 1978). The Nebraska statute is
very similar to the Indiana and Michigan acts. One exception is that, while the min-
eral interest owner can lose his interest after 23 years, the surface holder must bring
an action in equity before the statute deems the mineral interest abandoned. The
statute allows a grace period of two years, during which time the law will not extin-
guish any mineral interests. Compare NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 57-228 to 231 (Reissue
1978) with IND. CODE §§ 32-8-11-1 to 11-8 (1976) and MICH. COMP. LAWS. § 554.291
(MICH. STAT. ANN. § 26.1163(a) (Callaghan 1970)). See notes 10-11 supra.
74. 102 S. Ct. 781 (1982).
75. See notes 67-69 and accompanying text supra.
76. 102 S. Ct. at 792-93. In a somewhat lengthy opinion, Justice Stevens, writing
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Court concentrated primarily on a procedural due process inquiry.7
It found that the demand to record was the statute's only contractual
impairment,78 and therefore held that "such a minimal 'burden' on
contractual obligation" does not exceed the scope of permissible state
action.79
The Texaco, Inc. opinion fails to clarify whether the Court relied
on the Spannaus test8" or made a full Blaisdell contract clause analy-
sis.81 In its discussion of contract clause considerations, the Court
seemed to address only the extent of the impairment. 82 The Court
labeled the burden only "minimal" and did not interpose any evalua-
tion of the state's interest.83 Apparently, the Court found it inappro-
priate to balance the state's interest against the private interest
impaired; the impairment did not reach the threshold level required
for the more thorough Blaisdell test. However, within its specific dis-
cussion of the contract clause, the Court cited Blaisdell for its general
for a 5-4 majority, devoted only one paragraph specifically to contract clause
evaluation.
77. 102 S. Ct. at 793-96. The appellant Texaco, Inc. claimed that the mineral
owners did not receive constitutional notice of the statute's operation on their mineral
rights. The Court held basically that the Constitution requires the legislature only to
enact the legislation and give the public a reasonable time with which to familiarize
themselves with its demands. The Court asserted that persons within the state are
charged with the knowledge of any statute that affects their property. Further, be-
cause of the two-year grace period in the statute, the mineral owners had ample time
to familiarize themselves with the statutory provisions. 102 S. Ct. at 793-94. Dist-
inguishing Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank and Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950), the
Supreme Court stated that the requirement of individual notice applies only to judi-
cial proceedings and not to a self-executing statute such as the Indiana Mineral Act.
102 S. Ct. at 795.
78. Id. at 791-92.
79. Id. at 792. The Court, however, first claimed that the mineral interests con-
cerned were property and not contract rights, intimating that property rights would
not be protected by the contract clause. Id This distinction does not seem to be
founded in logic, as the mineral owners created their property rights by contracts,
which were being impaired. In fact courts have recognized that the contract clause
affords protection to property rights. Mahood v. Bessemer Properties, Inc., 154 Fla.
710, 18 So. 2d 775 (1944). The Court, apparently recognizing the inadequacy of its
property/contract distinction, then articulated the traditional contract clause analysis.
102 S. Ct. at 792-93.
80. See notes 40-48 and accompanying text supra.
81. See notes 27-38 and accompanying text supra.
82. 102 S. Ct. at 792.
83. Id, at 792-93.
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test of constitutionality.' Furthermore, the Court initially discussed
the constitutionality of recording acts and similar legislation in gen-
eral 5 and in so doing seemed to engage itself in balancing Indi-
ana's86 sovereign interest against the private interference such
statutes create. 87 These parts of the opinion support the view that the
Court-albeit subtly-made a more in depth contract clause review
than the Spannaus test requires.
Prior to Texaco, Inc., the Michigan Supreme Court in Van Slooten
evaluated a constitutional challenge to the Michigan Dormant Min-
erals Act. 8 Relying only on Spannaus, the court held the Michigan
legislation did not violate the contract clause.89 Like the Supreme
Court later held in Texaco, Inc., the Van Slooten court found that the
statute's recording requirement, which inserted a new contractual ob-
ligation, constituted the only cognizable impairment.9" Proceeding
from this conclusion, the court found the contractual impairment in-
substantial, and therefore not severe enough to reach the threshold
level necessary for the court to entertain a Blaisdell analysis.91
84. Id at 793 n.24.
85. Id at 790-91. For a discussion of the constitutionality of the recording acts
see note 51 and accompanying text supra.
86. 102 S. Ct. at 791-92. Justice Stevens discussed the state's strong interest in the
development of resources and collection of property taxes. Id
87. Id at 792. In this part of the opinion the Court asserted that it was within the
state's power to demand statutory compliance of such a minimal nature, when the
state sought to promote those important public goals. Id
88. 410 Mich. 21, 299 N.W.2d 704 (1980). For a discussion of the Michigan Dor-
mant Minerals Act see notes 10-11 supra.
89. Id at 39-41. 299 N.W.2d at 708-09. The Court also discussed El Paso v.
Simmons, 379 U.S. 497 (1965), by analogy in upholding the statute. Basically, the
court found that if the United States Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of
the statute in Simmons then the Dormant Minerals Act certainly would be constitu-
tional. The court also cited Jackson v. Lamphire, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 280 (1830) to sup-
port its conclusion that recording acts are constitutional. 410 Mich. at 40-41, 299
N.W.2d at 708-09. At no time did the court attempt to apply the facts of this case to
the Blaisdell criteria, but rather relied on the threshold test of Spannaus. Quoting
from Spannaus, the court asserted that the recording requirement did not create a
"high hurdle" for the statute to clear. Id at 39, 299 N.W.2d at 708.
90. Id at 47-50, 299 N.W.2d at 712-13.
91. Id The court did not assert that the mineral interests were themselves insub-
stantial and that therefore, because of the public good, the Constitution would permit
a statute to extinguish the mineral rights. The court avoided a determination of the
value of the mineral interests by viewing the demand to record as the statute's only
contractual interference. The United States Supreme Court adopted a similar line of
reasoning in Jackson v. Lamphire 28 (3 Pet.) 280 (1830). In that case, the Court re-
19821
Washington University Open Scholarship
URBAN LAW ANNUAL
Chief Justice Coleman in Van Slooten, like Justice Stevens writing
for the Court in Texaco, Inc., underestimated the breadth as well as
the severity of the impairment. This misjudgment could have far-
reaching implications on the contract clause as a restraint on state
legislation. These courts should not have viewed the demand to rec-
ord as constituting the only impairment, but also should have looked
to the practical effects of the statute.92 The legislation effectively de-
stroys the contractual covenant the grantor employed to reserve the
subsurface rights, thus causing the destruction of an existing fee sim-
ple interest.93
The Van Slooten court, by applying Spannaus to the Michigan re-
cording statute, avoided having to balance the state's public purpose
against the private interference. So long as courts do not require leg-
islatures to justify similar recording statutes, states enjoy free reign to
disturb a broad spectrum of contractual relationships. The Van
Slooten decision thus could permit the legislature to interfere with
any land contract 94 merely by imposing such a recording demand on
viewed the constitutionality of a recording statute imposed on owners who had ac-
quired land from the state. The Court held that an additional recording requirement
did not impair the contractual obligation because there was no covenant in the con-
tract prohibiting any further state action. Id at 289.
Van Slooten is distinguishable from Lamphire in that the Michigan statute imposes
a recording requirement where the state is not a party to the contract. As established
in United States Trust v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1 (1977), however, the Court will look
with greater scrutiny at a statute which alters a state's contract. Lamphire and Van
Sloaten interpose identical recording requirements. In light of the judicial policy set
down in United States Trust, if the recording requirement on a state contract is consti-
tutional in Lamphire, then such a statute certainly would be constitutional in Van
Slooten, where the court must apply a lesser degree of scrutiny.
92. See Faitoute Iron & Steel Co. v. City of Asbury Park, 316 U.S. 502, 514
(1942). The Court upheld a statute which provided relief for insolvent municipalities
from creditors. The Court asserted that in contract clause analysis, a court must look
to the practical effects of the statute. In quoting from Davis v. Mills, 194 U.S. 451,
457 (1903), the Court opined that "[t]he Constitution is 'intended to preserve practical
and substantial rights, not to maintain theories."' Id
93. See note 100 infra. This will be the practical effect, especially because many
of the interest holders are not even aware of the statute.
94. The Van Slooten court seemed to limit its finding to the recording of land
contracts. Such a ruling, however, easily could be extended by later courts, which
may seek to apply the doctrine to contracts of any kind. The Van Slooten court evalu-
ated the severity of the impairment based on the fact that the interest holders did not
rely on the absence of a recording requirement when entering into the land contract;
the impairment, therefore, was insubstantial. 410 Mich. at 39-41, 299 N.W.2d at 708-
09. Since few parties entering into a contract of any kind ever rely in this manner, a
court could make the same reliance conclusion with almost any contract. If the doc-
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owners whose property interests the government seeks to destroy.
Upon failure to record as prescribed, the owner will lose his contrac-
tual property rights. The Constitution certainly should not allow the
state unrestricted ability to use recording statutes as a pretext for de-
stroying contractual obligations."
The Van Slooten court, therefore, warrants criticism for its finding
of an insubstantial impairment. Otherwise, the contract clause pro-
vides few meaningful restrictions. Courts must not read the Span-
naus test96 to classify impairments rising to the magnitude of that in
Van Slooten as insubstantial. The test would abrogate entirely the
Framers' design to restrain state legislatures97 if it allowed a constitu-
tional validation in Van Slooten without a full contract clause analy-
sis.98 While the court approached the problem improperly, it clearly
arrived at the correct result.9 9 The dissent, properly finding a sub-
stantial impairment in the destruction of a fee simple estate,"°° pro-
ceeded to invoke the Blaisdell test. 10' Justice Levin asserted that the
trine is taken to its fullest extension, a statute can require the recording of any con-
tractual interest and deprive the owner upon his failure to record. While the statute
will strip a party of contractual rights, the court will view the impairment as insub-
stantial and hold the statute constitutional.
95. Although the Texaco, Inc. decision is ambiguous, if the Supreme Court relied
on Spannaus, then the identical argument is appropriate for Stevens' opinion.
96. See notes 40-48 and accompanying text supra.
97. See note 22 and accompanying text supra.
98. It is at least arguable that Texaco, Inc. held the statute constitutional after
entertaining this full analysis. Even if it did, however, the failure to recognize the
consequence of the statute (destruction of a fee simple interest; see notes 92-93 and
accompanying text supra) as the actual impairment can be crucial. By miscalculating
the severity of the impairment, the Supreme Court inappropriately denied weight to
the private interests involved when it balanced the public and private concerns. The
Court, by finding the more substantial impairment would have seen a more accurate
outcome in such a balance, and perhaps may have found that the public need did not
justify such severe private interference.
99. See notes 106-10 and accompanying text infra. The ultimate outcome in Tex-
aco, Inc. v. Short, 102 S. Ct. 781 likewise seems correct.
100. The dissent cited the Spannaus test indicating that a substantiality inquiry is
proper. According to the dissent the impairment should be measured by both the
"obligation" and "consequences of the failure to meet the new obligation." 410 Mich.
at 60, 299 N.W.2d at 718. The Justice asserted that, as in Spannaus, the new require-
ment was unforeseen. Further, the statute almost assuredly would destroy many in-
terests. The dissent therefore would have found the impairment substantial. Id at
60-61, 299 N.W.2d at 718.
101. Id at 57, 299 N.W.2d at 716-17. The dissent recited the five criteria of Blais-
dell. For the Blaisdell criteria see note 37 and accompanying text supra. In order to
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statute violated the contract clause because the legislature had neither
appropriately nor reasonably tailored it to the asserted public pur-
pose." The justice opined it reasonable to extinguish interests of
non-ascertainable owners, but constitutionally inappropriate to deem
abandoned the rights of those whom the state could easily locate.10 3
Thus, the overinclusive statute interfered unnecessarily with private
agreements.'°4
While accurately assessing the practical impact of the Michigan
statute, the Van Slooten dissent failed to perceive the severity of the
marketability and land resource problems that dormant mineral in-
terests create.' 0 5 Blaisdell contemplated that public problems of this
magnitude would not lie beyond legislative solution. The nation is
confronted with an energy crisis; 10 6 during this emergency, courts
set the stage for his opinion, Justice Levin then discussed the history of contract clause
analysis, from the post-Blaisdell cases to Spannaus. Id. at 57-59, 299 N.W.2d at 716-
18. See note 39 supra.
102. Id at 62-63, 299 N.W.2d at 719. The Justice recognized the state's purpose
of improving land resource exploration and found it legitimate. Id at 62, 299
N.W.2d at 719.
103. Id
104. Id The Justice concluded that the statute was too over-inclusive to pass con-
stitutional scrutiny. The Michigan statute, because it fails to distinguish between ac-
cessible and inaccessible owners, was compared to the statute held invalid in W.B.
Worthen Co. v. Kavanaugh, 295 U.S. 56 (1935). For discussion of Kavanaugh, see
note 39 supra.
Justice Levin also proposed statutory methods that would have been more reason-
able. He pointed out that the legislature could haie adopted methods short of forfei-
ture. For example, the Justice suggested that the statute could have established a
"royalty rate" such that the statute would force a lease upon an owner who failed to
record. The lease would enable interested parties to develop the land resources. 410
Mich. at 63, 299 N.W.2d at 719.
In addition, Justice Levin found that the statute is unreasonable because there is no
effort whatsoever to protect the interest holder. There is no attempt to locate the
owner, no attempt to compensate the interest holder from the proceeds of any re-
source development, and no attempt to notify the owner of any threat to his holdings.
Id at 63, 299 N.W.2d at 719-20. Contra, id at 52 n.28, 299 N.W.2d at 714 n.28
(where the majority opinion states that the statute itself provides sufficient notice of
the recording requirement).
105. The majority opinion, of course, did not have to address this issue. It dealt
with the contract clause argument by asserting that the contractual impairment did
not satisfy the threshold level of severity required by the Spannaus test. Such addi-
tional inquiry into the strength of the state's interest is therefore irrelevant to this
opinion's analysis. See notes 72-74 supra.
106. Brief of Appellant at xi, Bickel v. Fairchild, 83 Mich. App. 467, 268 N.W.2d
881 (1978).
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must not interpret the Constitution to prohibit remedial measures
such as that taken by Michigan. 107 The reasonableness and appropri-
ateness of a statute must be viewed in light of judicial deference to
legislative judgment, a policy illuminated throughout the history of
contract clause analysis.' The dissent does not place enough em-
phasis on this judicial mandate.' 9 While the dissent applied the
proper test, its conclusion cannot withstand the value imperatives
prescribed in Blaisdell. The majority appropriately found the Dor-
mant Minerals Act constitutional, but should have done so by adher-
ence to the contract clause balancing principles in Blaisdell and
applied by Justice Levin.
The Van Slooten court reached the proper result; a contrary out-
come would have drastically diminished Michigan's ability and sov-
ereign discretion to alleviate a threatening public problem." 0 Van
Slooten, like Texaco, Inc., may indicate a more restrictive view of the
contract clause in its capacity to invalidate state legislation"' at a
time when the clause seemed to be gaining strength, evidenced in
decisions such as Spannaus.I 2 The sharp changes in judicial atti-
tude, reflected in decisions before and after Blaisdell,"13 may con-
tinue. Perhaps when the United States Supreme Court confronts
what it believes to be an intolerable state interference with contrac-
tual obligations, the Court will be able to better articulate the extent
107. Id Blaisdell contemplated that the meaning of "emergency" should not be
construed narrowly. As stated in W.B. Worthen Co. v. Thomas, 292 U.S. 426, 433
(1934), the state's power is made available "by a great public calamity such as fire,
flood or earthquake, and the State's protective power could not be said to be non-
existent when the urgent public need demanding relief was produced by other and
economic causes." Id
108. See, e.g., Faitoute Iron & Steel Co. v. City of Asbury Park, 310 U.S. 502
(1942). For discussion of Fatoute see notes 39, 92 supra.
109. 410 Mich. at 59-60, 299 N.W.2d at 718. Justice Levin only purported to ap-
ply the policy of deference. By stating that the deference must be "harmonized with
the court's duty to apply the constitutional prohibition," id at 59, 299 N.W.2d at 718,
Levin appeared to be paying little attention to this judicial policy. In fact, in the
remainder of the opinion, he did not seem to resolve doubt as to reasonableness in
favor of the legislative judgment.
110. See note 2 supra.
111. The somewhat summary manner in which the Texaco, Inc. Court dealt with
the issue, may be indicative of the strength the Supreme Court feels it possesses. See
note 76 and accompanying text supra.
112. G. GUNTHER, supra note 39 at 556.
113. See note 39 supra.
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to which the contract clause imposes limits on state legislatures.1 14
Until then, the courts remain free to apply imprecisely the otherwise
well reasoned rationale of the Blaisdell-Spannaus contract clause
approach.
Richard M. Foster
114. Van Slooten v. Larsen was appealed to the United States Supreme Court,
Docket No. 80-1624. The Court, less than one week after its decision in Texaco, Inc.
v. Short, dismissed Van Slooten for "want of a substantial federal question." (Tele-
phone Discussion with the clerk's office of the United States Supreme Court). This
dismissal should not be surprising. The Court, failing to join this case with Texaco,
Inc., which had identical issues, had nothing to decide in Van Slooten. Hence, the
Court dismissed it.
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